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‘The methodology of positive economics’
(1953) does not give us the methodology of
positive economics
Uskali Mäki
Abstract It is argued that rather than a well defined F-Twist, Milton Friedman’s
‘Methodology of positive economics’ offers an F-Mix: a pool of ambiguous and
inconsistent ingredients that can be used for putting together a number of differ-
ent methodological positions. This concerns issues such as the very concept of
being unrealistic, the goal of predictive tests, the as-if formulation of theories,
explanatory unification, social construction, and more. Both friends and foes of
Friedman’s essay have ignored its open-ended unclarities. Their removal may
help create common ground for more focused debate in economics.
Keywords: Unrealistic assumptions, predictive tests, truth, as-if, unification,
social construction
1 FROM F-TWIST TO F-MIX
My title is not intended to suggest that there is a single authentic doctrine of
the methodology of positive economics, and that Milton Friedman’s 1953
essay (F53 for short) failed to describe it. It is rather to suggest that the
essay describes (ingredients for) too many methodological doctrines, hence
fails to capture a single doctrine. This also implies that if there is something
like Milton Friedman’s methodological view with a distinct and singular
identity, it is not described in F53. Thus I take popular references to things
such as ‘Friedman’s instrumentalism’ or ‘Friedman’s as-if methodology’ or
‘Friedman’s argument in support of unrealistic assumptions’ at best to high-
light limited aspects of the 1953 essay and at worst to denote nothing but
fictions. The message of F53 has tended to become a straw man, for friends
and foes alike.
My contributions to the discussion on F53 have emphasized its ambigu-
ities and its lack of coherence.1 This suggests the need for clarification and
reconstruction as a prerequisite for setting out to evaluate any definite
methodological claims and arguments possibly ascribable to Friedman or
his opponents. To suggest that economic theories should be judged by the
accuracy and scope of their predictions, or that the claims economic theo-
ries make should be formulated in terms of ‘as-if’, or that the assumptions
of an acceptable theory do not need to be true provided it predicts well – as
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in Paul Samuelson’s (1963) attribution of the F-Twist to Friedman – is
insufficient for determining anybody’s methodological or philosophical
outlook or for capturing what is distinctive of F53.
F53 appears as a mixture of ingredients many of which are ambiguous
and some of which are hard to reconcile with one another: we are served
an F-Mix. In consequence, a variety of readers with different intellectual
preferences will be able to find their own selection of ideas that they will
endorse or oppose. On my own favorite reading – my preferred selection of
ingredients – Friedman emerges as a realist and social constructivist rather
than, say, a positivist and instrumentalist.
The following brief remarks provide a selective review of puzzling ambi-
guities and inconsistencies in F53 and its readings. I should add that while
these features are puzzling, I find them very useful and instructive – and
that by identifying and removing them I believe we can, at the end (but not
here), refine Friedman’s deep insights into a coherent and sound method-
ological account of economics. Fifty years after its publication, I remain
fascinated by the insightfulness of F53 as well as challenged by the multiple
directions towards which its various ingredients can be developed.
2 ASSUMPTIONS AND PREDICTIONS
If there is one basic thesis conveyed by F53, it is this: economic theories
should not be judged by their assumptions but by their predictive implica-
tions – and in particular, the unrealisticness of the assumptions of a theory
is no reason for complaint or worry about the theory. The methodological
advice given to economists by F53 appears simple: when assessing a theory,
don’t pay attention to its assumptions, instead focus on the predictions
it yields. As the much cited statement puts it, ‘the only relevant test of
the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience.
The hypothesis is rejected if its predictions are contradicted (‘frequently’ or
more often that predictions from an alternative hypothesis); it is accepted if
its predictions are not contradicted’ (pp.8–9). This makes three important
points about testing scientific theories: testing is by predictive implications
not by assumptions; failed predictions play a key role: acceptances are
just failures to be rejected; and testing is comparative: what matters is the
predictive performance of a theory relative to that of alternative theories.
Understandably, Friedman’s main focus of attention in F53 is on assum-
ptions, not on predictions. After all, he has set out to convince the skeptical
or hesitant reader that unrealistic assumptions are just fine, and the argu-
ments of F53 revolve around this idea. Yet, in some cases the reader would
expect to be shown the full force of the basic thesis in its entirety, including
the role of predictive performance. Friedman does not hide his hostility
towards Edward Chamberlin’s theory of monopolistic competition – an
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The methodology of positive economics 497
inferior theory that economics does not need at all in addition to the sup-
erior models of perfect competition and perfect monopoly. The argument
of F53 is straightforward: the creation of the theory of monopolistic com-
petition was ‘explicitly motivated, and its wide acceptance and approval
largely explained, by the belief that the assumptions of “perfect competi-
tion” or “perfect monopoly” said to underlie neoclassical economic theory
are a false image of reality’ (p. 15), and it is this misguided motivation
and flawed basis of acceptance that speaks against the theory. There is no
appeal here to the superior predictive capacity of Friedman’s favorite
theories in contrast to the predictive failures of Chamberlin’s theory. The
realisticness or unrealisticness of assumptions was not supposed to matter,
but it seems they do, after all. The key thesis of F53 is thereby turned into
a modified non-predictivist torso: hail unrealistic assumptions, proscribe
against the pursuit of realistic assumptions.
This I believe is how many practicing economists have received the
message of F53. This explains its emancipatory effect on economists: it
helps liberate those employing models with unrealistic assumptions from a
sense of unease (see Mayer 1993). This also suggests why there is an easy
link between F53 and the defense of ‘blackboard economics’: that top
ranked part of economics that is mathematically highly refined and rigorous
but accused for being unconnected to real world facts and issues. Even
though Friedman is an opponent of formalistic blackboard economics, it is
not surprising to see appeals to F53 in justification to the assumptions that
help create the model worlds on the blackboard. A tension appears here
between Friedman’s intended methodology and the torso version of the
basic thesis of F53.
3 UNREALISTICNESS AS IRRELEVANT AND AS A VIRTUE
Friedman’s claim about unrealistic assumptions appears at least in two
versions: one is in terms of irrelevance, the other is in terms of virtue. The
weaker version is the claim that unrealisticness is irrelevant for the goodness
of theory: that it does not matter even if a theory’s assumptions are unreal-
istic. A consistent irrelevance thesis would have to imply that the actual
degree of both unrealisticness and realisticness does not matter. In other
words, no matter how unrealistic or realistic the assumptions of a theory,
this is irrelevant to the assessment of the theory. But the bulk of F53 is not
symmetric in this way, thus not in line with the weak version: the essay
keeps stressing that it is high degrees of unrealisticness that do not matter.
As the attack against more realistic behavioral assumptions and the theory
of monopolistic competition indicates, the pursuit of high degrees of real-
isticness is regarded as a serious demerit of both a theorist who does so and
of a theory that is pursued.
The strong version acknowledges this asymmetry and does it in a
radicalized manner: it is the claim that unrealisticness is a virtue, that the
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better the theory, the more unrealistic it is in its assumptions. Many readers
have found the strong version unacceptable, even outrageous. Indeed, as a
general rule, it must be mistaken. Even in some cases where violating the
truth may seem recommendable – such as in assuming a vacuum for falling
cannon balls and assuming profit maximization for certain purposes – the
strong version goes too far. Friedman’s examples of excellent scientific
theories assume zero air pressure and profit maximization. But there are no
better theories assuming that air pressure is infinitely large or that business-
men aim at maximizing their losses – these assumptions would be more
unrealistic than the ordinary ones, but surely not epistemically virtuous,
thus contradicting the strong version.
There are obvious cases in which both versions appear questionable.
In the study of the used cars market, it is neither irrelevant nor virtuous for
a theory to falsely assume that information is symmetric, and in the study
of the computer software industry, one is not well advised to assume dimin-
ishing returns. Qualifications and further conditions are needed: neither
version of Friedman’s thesis can be defended as a general principle.
4 INDIRECTLY TESTING APPROXIMATION TO THE TRUTH
It appears that Friedman himself does not hold either version of the thesis
consistently or without qualifications. It appears that, for him, predictive
tests serve as indirect tests of the approximate truth of assumptions. The
required degree of approximation is relative to the purposes that a theory
is supposed to serve: ‘the relevant question to ask about the ‘assumptions’
of a theory is . . .  whether they are sufficiently good approximations for
the purpose at hand’ (p. 15). And the way to measure whether the required
degree has been achieved is to put the theory in predictive test:
Complete “realism” is clearly unattainable, and the question whether a
theory is realistic “enough” can be settled only by seeing whether it yields
predictions that are good enough for the purpose in hand or that are
better than predictions from alternative theories.
(p. 41)
This implies that the unrealisticness of assumptions is not irrelevant
at all, something to be ignored. On the contrary, one is advised to pay
attention to their actual degree of realisticness and to judge whether it is
sufficiently high for the purposes at hand. It appears two kinds of con-
siderations shape these judgements: pragmatic and ontological. Pragmatic
considerations enter in the form of purposes: the appropriate degree of
(un)realisticness is relative to the purposes for which the theory is put.
Ontological considerations are concerned with the causal powerfulness of
various factors: some of them are too weak to be included in the model,
while others play major causal roles and should be included. In other words,
it all depends on the difference those factors make:
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 Why is it more ‘unrealistic’ in analyzing business behavior to neglect
the magnitude of businessmen’s costs than the color of their eyes? The
obvious answer is because the first makes more difference to business
behavior than the second; but there is no way of knowing that this is so
simply by observing that businessmen do have costs of different magni-
tude and eyes of different color. Clearly it can only be known by compar-
ing the effect on the discrepancy between actual and predicted behavior
of taking the one factor or the other into account.
(p. 33)
Another way of putting these ideas is to say that some of the assumptions
of a theory are to be paraphrased as statements about the negligibility of
a factor, and that predictive tests are a way of assessing such claims about
negligibility (Musgrave 1981, Mäki 2000). The vacuum assumption in
connection to predicting the behavior of a freely falling cannon ball should
be paraphrased as the statement that the impact of actual air pressure is
negligible, given one’s purposes (while it is not negligible in the case of
a falling feather): the deviation from the truth is negligibly small, or the
degree of approximation to the truth is sufficiently close. Such statements
about negligibility (‘the causal significance of deviations from the vacuum is
negligible for the purpose at hand’) should be required to be perfectly true
– while the non-paraphrased assumptions (‘there is a vacuum’) only provide
more or less distant approximations to the truth. These considerations do
not fit smoothly with an instrumentalist view of theory. They are rather
realist considerations, but they do not require the (non-paraphrased, yet
paraphrasable) assumptions to be perfectly or even moderately realistic. Yet
they stress the relevance of the issue of the realisticness of assumptions.
5 THE WHOLE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH
A theory can be unrealistic in a variety of ways, such as by violating ‘the
whole truth’ and by violating ‘nothing but the truth’ – by being incomplete
and by being false proper. These are separate notions, but F53 conflates
them – and so does much of other commentary about the realisticness issue.
In particular, the violation of the whole truth does not imply the violation
of nothing but the truth about some part of the whole.
Friedman implies the idea of the whole truth – or comprehensive truth –
when he envisages ‘a completely “realistic” theory of the wheat market’ that
mentions the color of the traders’ and farmers’ eyes and hair, antecedents
and education, the physical and chemical characteristics of the soil on which
the wheat was grown, the weather prevailing during the growing season,
etc., etc. (p. 32). He implies the notion of nothing but the truth when refer-
ring to the empirical criticisms of the maximization assumption that con-
clude that businessmen do not or cannot maximize their expected returns
(p. 31). And he implies a connection between the two when suggesting that
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criticizing the maximization assumption is as ridiculous as insisting on such
a completely realistic theory. The reasoning is not sound: it is trivial that
nobody will insist on having such a ‘theory’ – but it also should be trivial
that this has nothing to do with the insistence that it is no recommendation
for the maximization of returns assumption as such that it violates nothing
but the truth.
The distinction has implications for the assessment of the basic thesis
of F53. One may argue that good theories violate the whole (or compre-
hensive) truth in that they isolate just narrow slices of the world and
leave out most of it – such as most of the things listed in Friedman’s ‘com-
pletely realistic theory’ of the wheat market. One may go further and argue
that, subject to further (perhaps ontological and pragmatic) constraints, the
more a theory leaves out the better it is. One may also point out that such
theoretical isolations are often accomplished by way of false idealizing
assumptions (such as those of vacuum or homogeneous goods) that help
exclude factors (such as actual air pressure or product differentiation) that
are viewed as irrelevant for a problem at hand. These are some of the ways
in which good theories may be unrealistic.
6 TRUTH OF ASSUMPTIONS AND TRUTH OF THEORY
Most commentaries of F53 are based on the presumption that the truth
value of a theory is a function of the truth values of its assumptions or,
more directly, is equal to the truth value of the conjunction of its assump-
tions. On this picture, the falsehood of assumptions implies the falsehood
of the theory. Friedman and others admit that many of the central assump-
tions of the theories at stake are false. This then has been interpreted as
implying a special kind of instrumentalist view of theory: economic theories
are false instruments of prediction.
Friedman himself does a better job, and we can see this if we look a bit
more carefully. He uses expressions such as a theory being ‘descriptively
false in its assumptions’ (p. 14). We are not compelled to read this as admit-
ting that such theories are false. Indeed, it has been my contention that
theories with false assumptions may be true, and that realism (as a theory of
theories) is perfectly comfortable with unrealistic assumptions. The truth
value of a theory is not a straightforward function of the truth values of its
assumptions. The key for understanding the gap between the two is to ask
the question: what is the theory about, what claim does it make about the
world, if any? A theory may be true about the functioning of some impor-
tant causal factor while making false assumptions about the existence and
functioning of other factors. Galileo’s law is true about, well, what it is
about: namely the causal role of gravity in determining the behavior of
falling bodies. The core assertions of the law are not about air pressure,
magnetic forces, or the shape of the earth, but about the gravitational field
of the earth in relation to freely falling bodies. False assumptions about
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factors other than gravity imply nothing about the truth value of the law
statement itself.
7 TWO KINDS OF ‘AS-IF’
It seems to be generally believed that the use of ‘as-if’ in formulating theo-
retical claims commits one to an anti-realist (fictionalist or instrumentalist)
view about scientific theory. This is a mistake. The as-if formulation
is a flexible tool that can be used for expressing a number of ideas about a
theory and its relationship to the world. In F53, Friedman appears to be of
two minds as to the import of ‘as-if’. It is one thing to say that
(a) phenomena behave as if certain ideal conditions were met: conditions
under which only those real forces that are theoretically isolated are
active;
and it is quite another thing to say that:
(b) phenomena behave as if those forces were real.
The difference between the two is striking and has important philosophical
implications. Of the two, (a) is in the spirit of realism, while (b) allows for
a fictionalist reading. Formulation (a) says that the behavior of certain
phenomena is shaped by a real force isolated by the theory, and that it is
not shaped by any other factors, so that those phenomena behave as if
the theoretical isolation were materialized in the real world. This is what
Friedman is effectively saying in a general passage:
A meaningful scientific hypothesis or theory typically asserts that certain
forces are, and other forces are not, important in understanding a par-
ticular class of phenomena. It is frequently convenient to present such a
hypothesis by stating that the phenomena it is desired to predict behave
in the world of observation as if they occurred in a hypothetical and
highly simplified world containing only the forces that the hypothesis
asserts to be important.
(p. 40)
In his concrete illustrations, on the other hand, Friedman is closer to formu-
lation (b). The imaginative hypothesis of the leaves of a tree is the most
striking of his examples. Friedman suggests the
hypothesis that the leaves [around a tree] are positioned as if each leaf
deliberately sought to maximize the amount of sunlight it receives, given
the position of its neighbors, as if it knew the physical laws determining
the amount of sunlight that would be received in various positions and
could move rapidly or instantaneously from any one position to any
other desired and unoccupied position.
(p. 19)
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However, ‘so far as we know, leaves do not “deliberate” or consciously
“seek”, have not been at school and learned the relevant laws of science or
the mathematics required to calculate the “optimum” position, and cannot
move from position to position’ (p. 20). This means that we are aware of the
fictionality of the forces postulated, and that this awareness is expressed in
terms of the ‘as-if’. This rules out yet another way of using the ‘as-if’,
namely its epistemological use in expressing uncertainty: what follows an
‘as-if’ is a hypothesis describing one possibility, and it is the task of future
research to establish whether what appears possible is also actually the case.
This is not an option for the fictionalist use of ‘as-if’.
8 THEORETICAL ISOLATION AND ONTOLOGICAL
UNIFICATION
In line with the realist use of the ‘as-if’, F53 contains passages suggesting
that theory construction is a matter of theoretical isolation whereby
economists ‘abstract essential features of complex reality’ (p. 7). This is a
widely endorsed idea in economics and elsewhere: the real world is complex,
therefore we need to build simple models that theoretically isolate causally
significant aspects of the world. This general idea also provides justification
for the employment of false assumptions in such models. The simplest
version of Galileo’s law isolates the significant impact of gravity on the
falling body. It excludes the impact of other forces by false idealizations
such as those of vacuum, absence of magnetic forces, flatness of the earth.
On this picture, it is the task of false assumptions to help isolate major
causal factors.
Friedman’s remarks about these matters seem to be ontologically
motivated. The economist is supposed to theoretically isolate ‘essential
features of complex reality’ – which suggests that it is a feature of reality
itself that some of its features are essential. The same idea is conveyed by
another important passage in F53. This one introduces the realist notions of
deceptive appearances and ontologically grounded explanatory unification:
A fundamental hypothesis of science is that appearances are deceptive
and that there is a way of looking at or interpreting or organizing the
evidence that will reveal superficially disconnected and diverse phenom-
ena to be manifestations of a more fundamental and relatively simple
structure.
(p. 33)
One is invited to read this roughly as follows. The world is not as it appears
to be: appearances are deceptive manifestations of more fundamental struc-
tures. Scientific theories are required to capture those fundamental struc-
tures. A theory unifies apparently disconnected phenomena by showing
them to be manifestations of the same fundamental structure. Unification
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amounts to showing that those phenomena are really connected and only
apparently disconnected, and this is accomplished by successfully represent-
ing how things are related in the way the world works. This is a matter of
ontological unification (see Mäki 2001), and is only attainable by using a
theory that truthfully manages to isolate the key causes and relations in
economic reality.
9 FROM POSITIVISM TO SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM
Those who have read F53 as a positivist or falsificationist statement will
be disappointed upon being pointed out a few passages, completely ignored
by most commentators. If one takes the methodology of positive economics
to amount to a set of fixed and explicit rules for reasoning from given
evidence (or evidence fixed by convention or agreement), one should be
frustrated by the statements in F53 that emphasize the role of subjective
judgement, of the background of economists, of tradition, and of consensus
amongst them. In these statements, F53 acknowledges that strict predic-
tivist tests are unavailable in economics. Here is a representative passage,
making reference to something like the methodological culture of economics
in comparison to that of sociology:
Of course, neither the evidence of the economist nor that of the socio-
logist is conclusive. The decisive test is whether the hypothesis works for
the phenomena it purports to explain. But a judgement may be required
before any satisfactory test of this kind has been made, and, perhaps,
when it cannot be made in the near future, in which case, the judgement
will have to be based on the inadequate evidence available. In addition,
even when a test can be made, the background of the scientists is not
irrelevant to the judgements they reach. There is never certainty in
science, and the weight of evidence for or against a hypothesis can never
be assessed completely “objectively.” The economist will be more tolerant
than the sociologist in judging conformity of the implications of the
hypothesis with experience, and he will be persuaded to accept the
hypothesis tentatively by fewer instances of “conformity”.
(p. 30; emphases added)
In passing, F53 uses falsificationist jargon by referring to the ‘repeated
failure to be contradicted’ as evidence for a theory, but it simultaneously
acknowledges the role of social factors in shaping the fate of a hypothesis.
It recognizes the tenacity with which hypotheses are held against negative
evidence and the powerful role of tradition and continued use in creating the
image of an acceptable hypothesis: the discipline has its own epistemologi-
cally forceful folklore that supports a theory but is irreducible to an explicit
list of successful empirical tests. Here goes a key passage:
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[The evidence for the maximization-of-returns hypothesis] is extremely
hard to document: it is scattered in numerous memorandums, articles,
and monographs concerned primarily with specific concrete problems
rather than with submitting the hypothesis to test. Yet the continued use
and acceptance of the hypothesis over a long period, and the failure of
any coherent, self-consistent alternative to be developed and be widely
accepted, is strong indirect testimony to its worth. The evidence for a
hypothesis always consists of its repeated failure to be contradicted, con-
tinues to accumulate so long as the hypothesis is used, and by its very
nature is difficult to document at all comprehensively. It tends to become
part of the tradition and folklore of a science revealed in the tenacity with
which hypotheses are held rather than in any textbook list of instances in
which the hypothesis has failed to be contradicted.
(pp. 22–23; emphases added)
The core idea is that acceptances and rejections of theories are not strictly
rule-governed responses to empirical evidence, they rather depend on the
subjective judgements of economists whose behavior is shaped by their
background and social setting. Whatever label one may wish to use for
these ideas – pragmatism, collective conventionalism, or perhaps social con-
structivism – it is obvious that they reflect the practitioner’s actual experi-
ence that cannot be easily corrupted by positivist or falsificationist textbook
teachings about the scientific method. With these statements, Friedman has
shared his highly agreeable insights into the reality of scientific work, but
this has a price: tensions emerge with some other ingredients in F53.
THE METHODOLOGICAL VIEW CONVEYED BY ‘THE
METHODOLOGY OF POSITIVE ECONOMICS’: UP TO THE
READER
So, what is the methodology of positive economics? If you choose to consult
Milton Friedman’s ‘The methodology of positive economics’ as your main
source of information in answering the question, you will be put in a situa-
tion of choice. The menu provides ingredients for a number of doctrines,
such as fictionalism, instrumentalism, positivism, falsificationism, prag-
matism, conventionalism, social constructivism, and realism. You can
then choose any permutation of them, either coherent or incoherent. My
favorite choice is a coherent combination of realism and moderate social
constructivism (or whatever one may want to call the latter). You may have
different intellectual preferences. And are free to choose, Friedman might
add.
Uskali Mäki
Erasmus University of Rotterdam
umaki@fwb.eur.nl
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NOTES
1 See, e.g., Mäki (1986, 1992, 2000). My first paper on Friedman’s methodological
essay (‘Inconsistencies in Milton Friedman’s methodology for economics’)
in 1980 was prompted by, and took the shape of a critical response to,
Larry Boland’s (1979) JEL paper that had argued that F53 provides a coherent
argument for instrumentalism.
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